On logics of group belief in structured coalitions by Balbiani, Philippe et al.
  
   
Open Archive TOULOUSE Archive Ouverte (OATAO)  
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and 
makes it freely available over the web where possible.  
This is an author-deposited version published in : http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/ 
Eprints ID : 19194 
The contribution was presented at JELIA 2016 :  
http://www.cyprusconferences.org/jelia2016/index.html 
 
 
 
To cite this version : Balbiani, Philippe and Pearce, David and Uridia, Levan On 
logics of group belief in structured coalitions. (2016) In: 15th European 
Conference On Logics In Artificial Intelligence (JELIA 2016), 9 November 
2016 - 11 November 2016 (Larnaca, Cyprus). 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the repository 
administrator: staff-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
On Logics of Group Belief
in Structured Coalitions
Philippe Balbiani1, David Pearce2, and Levan Uridia3(B)
1 Universite´ de Toulouse, Toulouse, France
Philippe.Balbiani@irit.fr
2 Universidad Polite´cnica de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
david.pearce@upm.es
3 Razmadze Institute of Mathematics, Tbilisi, Georgia
l.uridia@freeuni.edu.ge
Abstract. In the study of group belief formation, groups of agents are
often assumed to possess a topological structure. Here we investigate
some ways in which this topological structure may provide the semantical
basis for logics of group belief. We impose a partial order on a set of
agents ﬁrst to be able to express preferences of agents by their doxastic
abilities, secondly to express the idea of a coalition (well formed group)
and thirdly to give a natural semantics for the group belief operator.
We deﬁne the group belief of a set of agents in two diﬀerent ways and
study their corresponding logics. We also study a logic where doxastic
preference is expressed by a binary operator. We prove completeness and
discuss correspondences between the logics.
1 Introduction
An important concept in the study of collective intentionality as well as group
reasoning is that of group belief. The nature of group belief has been analysed by
a number of scholars and is of interest in areas such as philosophy, psychology,
logic, social sciences and computer science. Quinton [9] for example discussed the
summative view whereby a group G has a group belief in a proposition p if most
of the members of G believe that p; here ‘most’ can refer to a simple numerical
majority or perhaps to a majority of members of a certain kind. More recent
work in the field of social ontology has taken a non-summative view according to
which individual beliefs do not play such an important role in forming the group
belief [6,10]. To have a group belief that p, in this kind of a non-summative,
agreement-based sense, it is neither sufficient nor even necessary that the group
members individually believe p. Instead, it is required that they together agree
that as a group they believe that p. Different versions of the summative and
non-summative views have recently been analysed by Gaudou et al. [5] who
develop in detail a modal logic of group belief and compare their formal system
to different philosophical accounts of the group belief concept.
In the discussion of group belief an important feature is that a group should
be a constituted collective. In the approach of [5] the nature of the constituted
group is given by the logic. More precisely, the logic is equipped with a possible
worlds semantics whose accessibility relation determines the nature of the group.
This idea seems to work well if one assumes that each group is constituted by a
unique set of agents A, but it may be problematic if a given set of individuals
constitutes two or more different groups. Suppose for example that the university
darts team happens to be co-extensive with the graduate admissions committee.
Their group beliefs will no doubt be different in the two contexts in which they
act. For instance the judgement that Phil Taylor is the greatest ever darts player
might be a belief of the darts team but not of the admission committee. This
difference in group beliefs will not be manifest in approaches like that of [5].
The authors are aware of this limitation. In another paper devoted to the logic
of group acceptance [8] they have introduced the idea of an institutional context
that enters into the semantics of group attitudes. This is a formal device that
allows one to distinguish the set of agents from the group or team situation
in which they are acting. It supplies an additional parameter of evaluation but
doesn’t impose any structure on the groups themselves.
A different kind of approach has been explored in work on judgement aggre-
gation. For example, List and Pettit [7] discuss group agency and group beliefs
by assuming that some organizational structure is associated with the groups.
This structure can be understood in at least two apparently different senses.
In one sense it refers to mechanisms such as voting rights and procedures that
may be in place in order for group judgements to be obtained by some ratio-
nal process from the beliefs and preferences of individual group members. Such
mechanisms may be thought of as external to the agents themselves, since they
reflect group features that may persist even if the set of agents that constitutes
the group changes over time. However, [7] also discusses ways in which a group
may be structured in a more internal sense. An example is when large judg-
mental tasks are decomposed into several smaller tasks and the corresponding
group judgements for these tasks are allocated to suitable subgroups. As List
and Pettit observe [7] (pp. 94–97), not all group members may have the same
level of expertise, so it may be rationally justified (at least in theory) to assign
judgement subtasks to say expert subgroups and then use a further aggregation
mechanism to form a final collective judgement for the whole group. In such
cases the chosen decomposition may reflect properties of individual members
(e.g. their expertise) and hence need not persist when members leave and enter
the group. Nevertheless it seems clear that such structures are group-specific in
kind, since if two different groups are composed of the same set of members, the
associated group structures will carve up that set in different ways.
In this paper we also study the idea of groups having a structure, but using a
different approach from that of [7]. We explore the effects of imposing a topologi-
cal structure directly on the set of agents and without assuming that judgmental
tasks are split into subtasks for resolution by a subgroup. One effect of our app-
roach is that even if say the university darts team and the humanities graduate
committee are composed of the same individuals, their constitution qua groups
(hence their collective beliefs) may be different. Another effect is that the topo-
logical structure may reflect a natural ordering among agents, such as their level
of knowledge of a certain domain, their abilities, their degree of commitment to
a certain cause, or some other relevant criterion. We will deal with finite sets of
agents and therefore the topological structure will amount to a partial ordering.1
In real life situations one observes that arbitrary subsets of agents do not form
a coalition. Usually coalitions are closed under some specific properties. Having
structured groups makes it possible to formalise different versions of group belief
and also explore the connections and differences between different approaches.
In this paper we attempt to model both ideas simultaneously by considering
partial orders on the sets of agents. It is known that such orders naturally model
many existing real life social commitments.2 Moreover with partial orders we
may understand coalitions as those sets of agents which have certain properties
according to the given order. In particular that they are downsets.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 3 we define a logic GB1 of group
belief where group belief is defined in terms of shared belief. The group belief
defined in this way inherits some properties of group belief discussed in [5]
although it lacks the important property that group belief p implies that it is
common belief that p is a group belief. To remedy this in Sect. 4 we define a logic
GB2 where group belief is defined in terms of common belief. This logic gains the
property that was missing for the logic GB1 but it loses another property satis-
fied by GB1, in particular: that group belief does not imply the common belief of
group members. In both Sects. 3 and 4 we extend the logics with a modal depen-
dency axiom which links the partial order of agents to their belief sets. In both
extended logics group belief collapses to the shared belief of group members. In
Sect. 5 we consider pure multi-modal logic with an additional operator a  b to
take control over the structure of agents. We prove several completeness results.
Completeness for the logics GB1 and GB2 is relatively simple and closely based
on already existing results, while completeness for the logic GB from Sect. 5 is
nonstandard and uses a selection method.
2 Preliminaries
We recall some basic definitions and notions which will be used throughout the
paper.
Definition 1. A partial order on a set A is a relation ≤⊆ A × A which is
reflexive ∀a ∈ A)(a ≤ a) and transitive (∀a, b, c ∈ A)(a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ c→ a ≤ c).
Every partial order has a distinguished class of subsets called downsets
1 Topological structures in groups are also used to formalise group attitudes in Dunin-
Keplicz and Verbrugge [3]. As they emphasise, this structure may be based on power
or dependency relations that reﬂect diﬀerent social commitments. [3] considers diﬀer-
ent group topologies but the approach is somewhat diﬀerent from ours. The topolo-
gies are mainly used to model diﬀerent forms of communication between agents in
a group. A related, formal account of group beliefs is studied in [2] using a concept
of (group) epistemic proﬁle to model doxastic reasoning. However epistemic proﬁles
are an additional feature, not derived from the group topological structure.
2 See e.g. [3] and further references given there.
Definition 2. A subset D of a partial order (A,≤) is a downset if for every
d ∈ D and every a ∈ A if a ≤ d then a ∈ D. The minimal downset containing the
set J ⊆ A will be denoted by J . In other words J = {a ∈ A | ∃b ∈ J s.t. a ≤ b}.
Throughout the paper we will be working in a standard multimodal language
enriched with different operators for common belief, shared belief group belief,
etc. The language L is defined with an infinite set of propositional letters p, q, r..
and connectives ∨,∧,¬,a, for each a ∈ A, where A is a finite, partially ordered
set (A,≤) of agents. Observe that the ordering of a set of agents A is common
for both the syntax and semantics. Formulas are constructed in a standard way
from the following recursive definition:
φ :=| p | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | aφ
for every a ∈ A and G ⊆ A. For extensions of L with additional operators we
will use the abbreviation L({Oi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}) where each Oi is a new operator
and the set of formulas is extended in an appropriate way i.e. in the construction
of formulas we will have additional clauses
φ :=| p | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | aφ | Oiφ
for every a ∈ A and i ∈ {1, .., n}. For example L({EJ | J ⊆ A} denotes the
language L extended with operators EJ for each J ⊆ A. Throughout the paper
the operators EJ , CJ and GBJ will stand for the shared belief, common belief
and group belief operators respectively.
Shared belief is defined as the conjunction of beliefs of individual members
of the group. i.e. a proposition p is a shared belief of the group J (abbreviated
as EJp) if every member of the group believes that p which means
∧
i∈J ip.
The shared belief operator is definable in the basic language and hence the
languages L and L({EJ | J ⊆ A}) have the same expressive power. This is not
the case for common belief. Common belief is defined as the infinite iteration
of individual beliefs of group members. Formally CJp iff
∧
n∈ω E
n
J p which is an
infinite conjunction and therefore is not a formula of the language L({EJ | J ⊆
A}. In general it is known that L({CJ | J ⊆ A} is strictly more expressive
then L.
3 Logics of Group Belief
We define a modal logic of group belief in a structured set (A,≤) of agents, where
the structure ≤⊆ A × A is a partial order. Coalitions are formed by downsets.
Therefore the structure of coalitions of agents will depend on the relation ≤ in
question.
3.1 Syntax of GB1
The language has two operators: for shared belief and for group belief. Shared
belief (analogous to shared knowledge) has been considered and studied inten-
sively, see for example [4]. We enrich the logic with a group belief operator where
group belief is defined as the shared belief of the coalition to which the group
belongs. Hence the two groups J and J ′ of agents have the same group belief if
they both belong to the same coalition.
Definition 3. The normal modal logic GB1 is defined in a modal language
L({EJ , GBJ | J ⊆ A}). Operators EJ and GBJ , stand for shared belief and
group belief respectively.
The axioms of GB1 are all classical tautologies. Each box satisfies the K4
axioms for every a ∈ A, and in addition we have one axiom scheme for shared
belief and one axiom scheme for the group belief,
a(p→ q)→ (ap→ aq) (1)
ap→ aap (2)
EJp↔
∧
a∈J
ap (3)
GBJp↔ EJp (4)
for every J ⊆ A. The rules of inference are: modus ponens, substitution and
necessitation for each box modality.
Observe that the axiom of group belief operator uses symbol J from
Definition 2, hence implicitly refers to the partial order on the set of agents
A. As it was mentioned in the introduction the order on agents is needed to
form coalitions and coalitions are exactly downsets according to the order on
agents. In these terms the group belief axiom from Definition 3 says that p is
a group belief of the a group of agents J if p is a shared belief of the minimal
coalition J to which the group J belongs.
Example 4 Every group forms a coalition. Assume that ≤ is an empty
relation. In this case the downset J = J . Hence every subset of agents forms a
coalition and hence group belief coincides with shared belief. GBJp ↔ EJp ↔
EJp.
Example 5 The only coalition. Assume that ≤= A×A. In this case we have
only one coalition as far as J = A for every J ⊆ A. Hence something is a group
belief only if it is a shared belief of all agents.
Example 6. Let A = {w, u, v} and ≤= {(w,w), (u, u), (v, v), (w, u), (w, v)}. In
this case we have 4 different coalitions {w, u}, {w, v}, {w, u, v} and {w}. Group
belief for this case depends on the group. If J = {u,w}, J = {v, w} or J = {w},
group belief coincides with shared belief GBJp ↔ EJp, while when J = {u, v}
we have GBJp↔ EAp and in cases when J = {u} or J = {v} group belief is a
shared belief of a corresponding coalition GBJp↔ E{u,w}p and GBJp↔ E{v,w}p
respectively.
3.2 Semantics
Semantics for the modal logics GB1 is provided by OUR-models.
Definition 7. An OUR-structure for a partially ordered set of agents (A,≤) is
a tuple (W, {Ra|a ∈ A}) where W is a set of worlds, Ra for each a ∈ A is a
transitive relation on W . An OUR-model is an OUR-structure together with a
valuation function V : Prop×W → 2.
Notice that the structure on a set of agent as well as the set of agents itself is
common both to the syntax and semantics. It is true that the syntax does not
contain any symbol for the relation ≤ but it interacts with this relation by the
group belief axiom. The semantics, as is clear from the next definition, has a
more straightforward interaction with the structure on the set of agents.
Definition 8. For a given OUR-model M = (W, {Ra|a ∈ A}, V ), the satisfac-
tion of a formula at a point w ∈W is defined inductively as follows:
w |= p iff w ∈ V (p);
the boolean cases are standard;
w |= aφ iff (∀v)(wRav ⇒ v |= φ);
w |= EJφ iff (∀v)(wRv ⇒ v |= φ) where R =
⋃
a∈J Ra;
w |= GBJφ iff (∀v)(wR
′v ⇒ v |= φ) where R′ =
⋃
a∈J Ra;
A formula is valid in an OUR-structure if it is satisfiable at every point
w ∈ W under every valuation V . A formula is valid in a class C of OUR-
structures if it is valid in every OUR-structure F ∈ C.
What does the last definition imply in different examples? The idea is to
think of coalitions as downsets. In such a setting each member of a group J may
believe the sentence p but the coalition J may have additional members who
do not share this belief and hence the group J as part of the coalition does not
have p as a group belief of a coalition. In other words only those sentences are
believed by the group which are shared beliefs of the coalition to which the group
belongs. We might call this kind of belief “coalition dependent”.
The group belief operator defined in this sense has the following properties
discussed in [5]:
Proposition 9
1. No combination of individual beliefs implies group belief;
2. Not all sets of agents form coalitions;
3. Group belief does not imply the common belief of the group;
Proof. 2 follows by the definition of coalition. 3 is an easy application of the
definitions of common belief and shared belief. See Sect. 2. For 1 let us consider
a partial order ({a, b, c},≤) of agents where a ≤ b ≤ c. Let J = {b, c}. As
for the set of possible worlds and relations, let us take W = {w, u, v}, Ra =
{(w, u), (w, v), (u, v)} and Rb = Rc = {(v, u), (v, w), (u,w)} let w |= p and v |= q.
See Fig. 1.
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In this case u |= bp ∧cp since the only successor of u both by Rb and Rc
is w which on its own models p. This means that all members of the group J
believe in p but still p is not a group belief of the group. This is because the
coalition J containing the group also contains agent a. u |= ap as there is an
Ra successor v of u which does not model p. So u |= EJp.
Note that bp ∧cp is just one particular combination of individual beliefs
and hence it is not enough to claim that no combination of individual beliefs
implies group belief. But an easy argument shows that indeed no formula written
in a restricted language which only contains b and c can imply group belief.
The full proof of this claim needs additional definitions and properties and is
given in the appendix.
The other two important properties from [5] “Goup belief does not imply
individual beliefs of the group members” and “Group belief does not imply
subgroup belief” are not satisfied. This is because the group is always contained
in the coalition and as well every subgroup is contained in a coalition formed
by a bigger group. Now what happens if we add the belief dependency axiom?
Does it effect the structure. The answer is yes. The belief dependency axiom sets
some constraints on the structure of frames.
3.3 Completeness
One way to prove completeness is via a standard canonical model construction.
Here we use a different method and prove completeness by applying results from
[11]. First we show that the axiom for the group belief modality is a relational
modal definition. Secondly we will use the result that modal logic with the shared
belief modality is complete, and lastly we will apply the result that extensions
of complete logics with relational modal definitions yield complete logics.
Definition 10. A modal definition ⊞p ↔ φ(p, p1, . . . , pn) is called a relational
modal definition if there exists a first-order formula Ψ+(x, y) with two free
variables using only symbols that occur in STx[φ(p, p1, . . . , pn)] such that for
every formula ψ in the language without ⊞ it holds that
(∀y)(Ψ+(x, y)⇒ STy[ψ]) is logically equivalent to STx[φ(ψ, p1, . . . , pn)].
Let Ψ+(x, y) be the first-order formula corresponding to a relational modal
definition. Given a model M = (F, V ), we uniquely construct the model
M+ = (F+, V ), where the underlying frame F+ is obtained from F by adding
the binary relation R+ ⊆W
2 defined as:
(x, y) ∈ R+ if, and only if, M |= Ψ+(x, y).
For a class C of models, we denote by C+ the class consisting of the models M+,
where M ranges over the models in C.
Fact 11. Let L be the modal language for a signature 〈Π,M〉, and let L+ be
the modal language for 〈Π,M ∪ {+}〉 for some fresh symbol ‘+’. Let L ⊆ L be
a modal logic that is complete w.r.t. a class C of models. Let L+ ⊆ L+ be the
modal logic obtained by extending L with the relational modal definition ⊞p ↔
α(p, p1, . . . , pn). Then L+ is complete w.r.t. C+.
Another result which we are going to use is completeness of the modal logic
obtained by eliminating the group belief operator from logic GB1. The result as
stated does not appear anywhere but an exact analog of the result is known for
the shared knowledge operator, see [4]. And the distinction between the two is
insignificant for these results.
Proposition 12. The modal logic of shared belief (The logic obtained by elim-
inating operator GBJ together with the group belief axiom from GB1) is sound
and complete w.r.t. possible world structures (Kripke structures), where each
relation is transitive.
Lastly, to obtain the completeness for the logic GB1 it remains to show that
the group belief axiom is a relational modal definition and describe the class of
frames it specifies.
Proposition 13. The axiom GBGφ↔ EGφ is a relational modal definition.
Proof. Immediate if we take Ψ+(x, y) in Definition 10 to be xRy where R =⋃
a∈GRa.
Corollary 14. The modal logic GB1 is sound and complete w.r.t. OUR-
structures.
3.4 Fibered Structures
By ordering the set of agents we want to reflect the intuition that not all agents
have the same belief sets. Moreover it is natural to think that the structure of
agents is connected with the structure of their belief sets. Which is not the case
in OUR-frames from previous section. For instance if a ≤ b, then belief set of a
is smaller then belief set of b. At this point we don’t have such a requirement.
One could obtain this property by adding the law a ≤ b⇒⊢ bp→ ap, which
we encode by the following axiom:
• Belief dependency axiom
ap→ GB{a}p
Now the meta-rule a ≤ b⇒⊢ bp→ ap becomes satisfied. For, assume a ≤ b,
by the belief dependency axiom we have ap → GB{a}p, and by the axiom for
the group belief operator we get bp → E{b}p and, as a ≤ b, we know that
a ∈ {b}. By the axiom for shared belief we obtain E
{b}
p →
∧
i∈{b}
ip which
on its own implies ap. Hence we get bp → ap. Thus, despite the fact that
our language does not contain the symbol ≤, it is strong enough to express the
property of belief dependency. By GB1≤ we denote the extension of GB1 by the
belief dependency axiom.
Definition 15. Let us call an OUR-structure (W, {Ra|a ∈ A}) a fibered frame
iff a ≤ b implies Ra ⊆ Rb.
Proposition 16. The belief dependency axiom is valid in an OUR-frame F =
(W, {Ra|a ∈ A}) iff F is a fibered frame.
Proof. Assume for the contradiction that an OUR-structure F is not fibered. By
definition this means that there exists a and b in the set of agent A such that
a ≤ b while Ra ⊆ Rb, i.e. there are points w, u ∈ W such that wRau while not
wRbu. Take a valuation such that p is true everywhere in a frame except at u,
then it is clear that w |= bp while w |= ap sincet wRau and u |= p. Hence
w |= GB{b}p which falsifies the axiom.
Now assume that F is a fibered OUR-structure. Let V be an arbitrary val-
uation on F. Let us take an arbitrary point w ∈ W and show that w |= bp →
GB{b}p for an arbitrary b ∈ A. Assume that w |= bp. Hence for every Rb suc-
cessor v of w it holds that v |= p. Let us show that w |= E
{b}
p. By the axiom of
shared belief Ebp↔
∧
a∈bap, it suffices to show that w |= ap for every a ≤ b.
Now since F is fibered, a ≤ b implies that Ra ⊆ Rb. Hence every Ra successor u
of w is also an Rb successor and we already know that every such u satisfies p.
The following proposition shows that fibered frames do not preserve the
property of group belief from Proposition 9. Proof of the following proposition
can be found in Appendix.
Proposition 17. In every fibered OUR-structure, the group belief of a set of
agents is implied by the conjunction of the individual beliefs of those agents that
have maximal belief sets from the group.
Corollary 18. In every fibered OUR-structure, the group belief of a set of agents
is equivalent to the shared belief of the same set of agents.
This shows that the notion of group belief as defined above does not make
much sense in the class of fibered frames and the language collapses to a simple
modal language with many modalities. In Sect. 5 we will consider the logic of
a pure modal language of ordered agents with an additional operator reflecting
the order of agents and derive the completeness of the logic w.r.t. the class of
fibered structures.
4 Syntax of GB2
An important property of group belief discussed in [5], which our definition of
group belief lacks, is the following: ‘If p is a group belief of a group G, then it is a
common belief that p is a group belief of the group’. As we saw from the example
this property is not satisfied for GB1. In this section is modify the logic GB1 so
that the desirable properties of GB1 are preserved but additionally group belief
satisfies the above condition. We consider a modal logic GB2 in which shared
belief is replaced by common belief.
4.1 Syntax
Definition 19. The language of the normal modal logic GB2 is L({CJ , GBJ |
J ⊆ A}) where the operators CJ stand for common belief. The axioms are all
classical tautologies, each box satisfies K4 axioms a(p → q) → (ap → aq)
and ap → aap for every a ∈ A. In addition we have an equilibrium axiom
for common belief:
(equi) : CJp↔
∧
a∈J
ap ∧
∧
a∈J
aCJp
And a new axiom for the group belief operator
GBJp↔ CJp
for every J ⊆ A. The rules of inference are: modus ponens, substitution and
necessitation for each box modality and additionally an induction rule for the
common believe operator:
(ind) :
⊢ p→
∧
a∈J a(p ∧ q)
⊢ p→ CJq
4.2 Semantics
A semantics for GB2 is provided by OUR-models. Let us first recall the definition
of the transitive closure of a binary relation.
Definition 20. The transitive closure R+ of the relation R is defined in the
following way: xR+y ⇔ (∃x1,∃x2, ...,∃xn)(x = x1∧x1Rx2∧x2Rx3∧ ...∧xnRy)
for some n ∈ ω.
Now we are ready to define the satisfaction of modal formulas on OUR-models.
Definition 21. For a given OUR-model M = (W, {Ra|a ∈ A, V }), the satisfac-
tion of a formula at a point w ∈W is defined inductively as follows:
w |= p iff w ∈ V (p);
the boolean cases are standard;
w |= aφ iff (∀v)(wRav ⇒ v |= φ);
w |= CJφ iff (∀v)(wRv ⇒ v |= φ) where R = (
⋃
a∈J Ra)
+;
w |= GBJφ iff (∀v)(wRv ⇒ v |= φ) where R = (
⋃
a∈J Ra)
+;
A formula is valid in an OUR-structure if it is satisfiable at every point
w ∈ W under every valuation V . A formula is valid in a class C of OUR-
structures if it is valid in every OUR-structure F ∈ C.
The following result for GB2 shows that some of the good properties of group
belief defined the previous section are preserved for the group belief operator of
GB2 and additionally the latter has the property that ‘If p is a group belief of a
group J then it is a common belief that p is a group belief of the group.’ Proof
is given in Appendix.
Proposition 22
1. No combination of individual beliefs imply group belief;
2. Not all sets of agents form coalitions;
3. If a sentence p is a group belief of a set of agents J then is is common belief
(of the set of agents J) that p is a group belief of the set of agents J ;
4.3 Completeness
The main result for this section is that the logic GB2 is the logic of all OUR-
structures with the given semantics. Observe that completeness for this case can
not be obtained by the technique of Sect. 3.3 since the axiom GBJp↔ CJp is not
a relational modal definition. The reason is that the transitive closure used for
defining the semantics of the common belief operator is not first order definable.
Nevertheless we are able to prove the completeness of the logic GB2 by a slight
modification of the completeness proof for the logic of common belief [4]. A proof
sketch can be found in Appendix.
Theorem 23. The logic GB2 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all OUR-
structures.
5 The Logic of Fibered Structures
In this section we introduce the logic of fibered structures in a simpler language
which does not contain a group belief operator. Instead we have an operator 
which captures the partial order of agents. An analogous approach with geomet-
ric interpretations of the operator  has been introduced in [1]. The set FOR of
all formulas (with typical members denoted φ, ψ, etc.) is now inductively defined
as follows:
– φ, ψ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬φ | (φ ∨ ψ) | aφ | a  b.
We define the other Boolean constructs as usual. The formula a  b is an abbre-
viation for: ¬a  b. We omit parentheses if this does not lead to any ambi-
guity. The notion of a subformula is standard. For all sets x of formulas, let
ax = {φ : aφ ∈ x}.
5.1 Semantics
For a given OUR-model M = (W, {Ra | a ∈ A}, V ), the satisfaction relation is
defined as follows for formulas of the form a  b:
– w |= a  b iff (∀v)(wRav ⇒ wRbv).
Therefore, in our setting, “a  b” means that a believes everything that b
believes.
We remark that
Lemma 24. The following formulas are satisfied in any world of any model:
– aφ→ aaφ,
– a  a,
– a  b ∧ b  c→ a  c,
– a  b→ (bφ→ aφ),
– a⊥ → a  b.
Proof. Since OUR-models are based on transitive relations, formulas of the form
aφ → aaφ are valid. The validity of formulas of the form a  a and a 
b∧ b  c→ a  c comes from the fact that the relation of inclusion between sets
is reflexive and transitive. For formulas of the form a  b→ (bφ→ aφ), they
are valid because in an OUR-model M = (W, {Ra | a ∈ A}, V ), if w |= a  b
then Ra(w) ⊆ Rb(w) where R(w) denotes the set of all accessible porints from
w. Concerning formulas of the form a⊥ → a  b, they are valid because in an
OUR-model M = (W, {Ra | a ∈ A}, V ), if Ra(w) = ∅ then w |= a  b.
5.2 Axiomatization/Completeness
Let L be the least normal modal logic in our language containing the formulas of
Lemma 24. We want to show that L provides a sound and complete axiomatiza-
tion of the set of all valid formulas. By Lemma24, L is sound. To prove complete-
ness, we must show that every valid formula is in L. It suffices to prove that every
consistent formula is satisfiable. To reach this goal, we use a step-by-step method.
We define a subordination model to be a structure S = (W, {Ra | a ∈ A}, σ)
where W is a nonempty subset of N, Ra is an irreflexive transitive relation on
W and σ is a function assigning to each x ∈W a maximal L-consistent set σ(x)
of formulas such that
– if aφ ∈ σ(x) then for all y ∈W , if xRay then φ ∈ σ(y),
– if a  b ∈ σ(x) then Ra(x) ⊆ Rb(x).
For all maximal L-consistent sets Γ of formulas, let SΓ = (WΓ , {RΓa | a ∈
A}, σΓ ) be the structure where WΓ = {0}, RΓa = ∅, σ
Γ (0) = Γ . The reader may
easily verify that
Lemma 25. SΓ is a finite subordination model.
Consider a finite subordination model S′ = (W ′, {R′a | a ∈ A}, σ
′). We define a
-imperfection in S′ to be a triple of the form (x, a, φ) where x ∈ W ′, a is an
agent and φ is a formula such that aφ ∈ σ
′(x) and for all y ∈W , if xR′ay then
φ ∈ σ′(y).
Lemma 26. Let (x, a, φ) be a -imperfection in S′. Let Γ be a maximal L-
consistent set of formulas such that aσ
′(x) ⊆ Γ and φ ∈ Γ . Let y be a new
nonnegative integer. Let S = (W, {Ra | a ∈ A}, σ) be the structure where
– W =W ′ ∪ {y},
– zRbt iff one of the following conditions holds:
• z ∈W ′, t ∈W ′ and zR′bt,
• z ∈W ′ \ {x}, t = y, zR′bx and a  b ∈ σ
′(x),
• z = x, t = y and a  b ∈ σ′(x),
– σ(z) = if z = y then Γ else σ′(z).
Then, S is a finite subordination model. We shall say that S is the local comple-
tion of S′ with respect to the -imperfection (x, a, φ).
We define a -imperfection in S′ to be a triple of the form (x, a, b) where x ∈W ′
and a, b are agents such that a  b ∈ σ′(x) and R′a(x) ⊆ R
′
b(x).
Lemma 27. Let (x, a, b) be a -imperfection in S′. Let Γ be a maximal L-
consistent set of formulas such that aσ
′(x) ⊆ Γ . Let y be a new nonnegative
integer. Let S = (W, {Ra | a ∈ A}, σ) be the structure where
– W =W ′ ∪ {y},
– zRct iff one of the following conditions holds:
• z ∈W ′, t ∈W ′ and zR′ct,
• z ∈W ′ \ {x}, t = y, zR′cx and a  c ∈ σ
′(x),
• z = x, t = y and a  c ∈ σ′(x),
– σ(z) = if z = y then Γ else σ′(z).
Then, S is a finite subordination model. We shall say that S is the local comple-
tion of S′ with respect to the -imperfection (x, a, b).
Let (x0, a0, φ0), (x1, a1, b1), (x2, a2, φ2), (x3, a3, b3), . . . be an enumeration of (N×
A×FOR)∪ (N×A×A) in which each item appears infinitely many times. For
all maximal L-consistent sets Γ of formulas, let T 0 = (W 0, {R0a | a ∈ A}, σ
0),
T 1 = (W 1, {R1a | a ∈ A}, σ
1), etc., be the infinite sequence of subordina-
tion models defined as follows. Let T 0 = SΓ . Let n be a nonnegative integer.
Given T 2×n, let T 2×n+1 be the local completion of T 2×n with respect to the -
imperfection (x2×n, a2×n, φ2×n) when (x2×n, a2×n, φ2×n) is a -imperfection of
T 2×n. Otherwise, let T 2×n+1 be T 2×n. Now, let T 2×n+2 be the local completion
of T 2×n+1 with respect to the -imperfection (x2×n+1, a2×n+1, b2×n+1) when
(x2×n+1, a2×n+1, b2×n+1) is a -imperfection of T
2×n+1. Otherwise, let T 2×n+2
be T 2×n+1. Now, we put Tω = (Wω, {Rωa | a ∈ A}, σ
ω) to be the subordination
model defined as follows:
– Wω =
⋃
{Wn: n is a nonnegative integer},
– if x ∈Wm for some nonnegative integer m and y ∈Wn for some nonnegative
integer n then xRωa y iff xR
m+n
a y,
– if x ∈Wn for some nonnegative integer n then σω(x) = σn(x).
The reader may easily verify that Tω has no imperfection. The result that
emerges from the discussion above is:
Proposition 28. The following conditions are equivalent for every formula φ:
1. φ is in L.
2. φ is valid.
Proof. 1.⇒ 2.: By Lemma 24.
2. ⇒ 1.: Suppose φ ∈ L. Let Γ be a maximal L-consistent set of formulas such
that φ ∈ Γ . Let Tω = (Wω, {Rωa | a ∈ A}, σ
ω) be the subordination model
associated to Γ as above. Let M = (W, {Ra | a ∈ A}, V ) be the model defined
as follows:
W =Wω, xRay iff xR
ω
a y, V (p) = {x | p ∈ σ
ω(x)}.
By induction on ψ, the reader may easily verify that for all x ∈ W , x  ψ iff
ψ ∈ σω(x). Since φ ∈ Γ , therefore 0  φ. Consequently, φ is not valid.
6 Summary and Future Work
In this preliminary study we have explored different ways in which group belief
might be modeled when a certain structure is imposed on the set of agent.
Group belief in the resulting logics displays different properties, suggesting that
the logics may have different types of application - a topic for further study in
the future.
As we have seen both logics, GB1 and GB2, collapse to standard multi-modal
languages when a belief dependency axiom is added. This shows that on a seman-
tical level there is natural correspondence between the GB1≤ and GB2≤ and the
logic of all fibered structures from Sect. 5. This suggests the possibility of syn-
tactic connections between the three logics which we aim to explore in future
work.
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